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employer. Public employee speech doctrine has long established wide
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show at the threshold that their speech was on a matter of public concern and
not an internal workplace matter. The Supreme Court’s pronouncements
over the last decade in a related doctrinal area, however, have unsettled the
line demarcating workplace speech. In its agency fees cases, the Court has
repeatedly stated that when a union speaks on matters of interest to the
general public, even internal workplace matters, it triggers constitutional
scrutiny. Taken at face value, the new definition of matters of public concern
in a government workplace provides a basis for employees to claim
expanded free speech protection. This Note is the first scholarly work to
propose how public employees will claim expanded speech protection on the
basis of the Court’s holding in Janus v. American Federation of State,
County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME). The expanded definition of
matters of public concern is likely to destabilize public employee speech
doctrine, causing uncertainty for employers as to how to supervise
employees in compliance with the First Amendment.
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INTRODUCTION
Individuals have a First Amendment right to criticize the government,
even if their speech is insulting, vulgar, racist, or untrue. 1 For government
employees, however, this does not translate to freedom to criticize one’s
boss. Over twenty million people work in the public sector, including
teachers, police officers, firefighters, prison guards, and social workers, as
well as workers in federal, state, and local governments and agencies. 2 The
Supreme Court has recognized that the government requires wide latitude to
adequately supervise these employees—including the power to regulate
employee speech. Without this latitude, a public workplace could transform
into a town hall meeting of employee grievances. Most employee speech
constitutes internal workplace speech. Only when government workers
speak as citizens on a matter of public concern can they receive First
Amendment protection. Thus, the government’s ability to efficiently
function depends on the contours of how the Court defines workplace
speech.

1

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (striking down a hate crime ordinance); Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19–21 (1971) (holding that vulgar speech like “Fuck the Draft” expresses ideas
protected by the First Amendment); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964)
(prohibiting defamation suits by government officials absent evidence of actual malice).
2 ROBERT JESSE WILLHIDE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL SURVEY OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT &
PAYROLL SUMMARY REPORT: 2013, at 1–2, 8 (2014), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/
library/publications/2014/econ/g13-aspep.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SJE-THNK]. As of March 2013, there
were 21.8 million people working in the public sector. Id. at 2.
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Consider the following example. Donald Olendzki, a psychologist at a
state prison, was concerned that conditions for him and his fellow employees
were dangerous. 3 As a member of the executive board of his union, he began
to raise these complaints to management. 4 In union meetings, he told them
that mentally ill inmates were causing unsafe conditions and that a dangerous
dental tool had gone missing. 5 In his capacity as a union board member, he
accompanied a coworker to her disciplinary hearing. 6 He also persistently
spoke about his belief that the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
were not being followed. 7 In his lawsuit, Olendzki alleged that his superiors
eventually retaliated against him for his advocacy. 8 The Seventh Circuit held
that he had not raised any issues that constituted a matter of public concern,
and therefore, his speech was not protected by the First Amendment. 9
If Olendzki were to bring a case involving union-related speech today,
it might turn out quite differently. Over the past decade, critics of unions
have argued for a new definition of workplace speech in a closely-related
doctrinal area: agency fees. A forty-year-old precedent established in Abood
v. Detroit Board of Education had allowed unions to charge agency fees
(colloquially known as “fair share dues”) to nonmembers to pay the costs of
representing those employees who choose not to join the union. 10 In a series
of cases, opponents of agency fees argued that, when unions charge such fees
to nonmembers, it violates the fee-payers’ First Amendment rights. These
plaintiffs contended that, because collective bargaining affects government
expenditures and public policy, agency fees “speak” on matters of public
concern. Compelling nonmembers to pay agency fees thus amounted to
unlawful forced speech.
In 2018, the Supreme Court agreed. In Janus v. American Federation
of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), the Court overruled
its precedent in Abood and held that agency fees are unconstitutional. 11 In its
opinion, the Court held that the topics of collective bargaining
“overwhelmingly” involve matters of “great public concern.” 12 This
pronouncement was in sharp contrast to the well-established principle since
Pickering v. Board of Education that, in the government workplace, matters
3

Olendzki v. Rossi, 765 F.3d 742, 744 (7th Cir. 2014).
Id.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 745.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 745–46.
9 Id. at 747–49.
10 See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
11 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2463–86 (2018).
12 Id. at 2475, 2477.
4
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of public concern do not encompass all topics potentially interesting to the
public. 13 Now, with Janus, collective bargaining topics including wages,
working conditions, and workplace operations appear to be back on the table
as potentially “of public concern.” What had previously been considered an
internal workplace matter about the prosaic operations of a government
employer could turn into a constitutional case.
It is not clear how the Court will grapple with the impact that the newly
expansive definition of matters of public concern will have on public
employee speech doctrine. Some have observed that the Court’s holding has
created an inconsistency in First Amendment jurisprudence and could form
the basis of new protections for public employees. 14 This Note is the first
scholarly exposition of how and why Janus will allow government workers
to claim new protections. Specifically, it proposes that public employees can
now argue for First Amendment protection when they speak (1) on unionrelated topics, (2) as a union official, and (3) about workplace matters. And
so long as they can demonstrate that their interest in speaking outweighs their
employer’s interest in restricting their speech, 15 public employees can win
their cases.
This Note proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of when the
government may impinge on its employees’ First Amendment rights, in both
public employee speech doctrine and agency fees doctrine. Then, Part II
argues the two doctrines are inextricably connected because they govern the
same workers, the same employers, and the same topics of speech—and
because they both are grounded in the recognition that the government
operates with great latitude when it acts as an employer. Part II further argues
13 391 U.S. 563, 563–64 (1968) (explaining that the employee’s speech was directed toward the
public and was, therefore, a matter of public concern); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149
(1983) (“To presume that all matters which transpire within a government office are of public concern
would mean that virtually every remark—and certainly every criticism directed at a public official—
would plant the seed of a constitutional case.”).
14 See, e.g., Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2496 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“If all that speech really counted as ‘of
public concern’ . . . the mass of public employees’ complaints (about pay and benefits and workplace
policy and such) would become ‘federal constitutional issues.’” (quoting Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri,
564 U.S. 379, 391 (2011))); Brief for Amici Curiae Charles Fried & Robert C. Post in Support of Neither
Party at 7, Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (No. 16-1466); Catherine L. Fisk, Janus: Weaponized First Amendment
Shoots at Democracy, ACSBLOG (July 2, 2018), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/janus-weaponized-firstamendment-shoots-at-democracy [https://perma.cc/9U6P-L2AL] (arguing “the Court needs to explain
why employees can get fired for complaining about their work, but not for refusing to pay fair share
fees”); Ann C. Hodges, Beware the Unintended Consequences of Janus, ACSBLOG (Feb. 20, 2018),
https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/beware-the-unintended-consequences-of-janus [https://perma.cc/2CA4W5K4] (predicting that “[a] ruling in favor of the Janus plaintiffs could obliterate the distinction [between
employee and citizen speech], requiring employers to tolerate much unwanted speech by their
employees”).
15 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 150 (describing interest balancing in public employee speech doctrine).
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that, when the Court ruled agency fees unconstitutional in Janus, it offered a
new definition of matters of public concern, one that will collide with public
employee speech doctrine. Finally, Part III evaluates the implications of the
Janus Court’s holding that agency fees categorically speak on matters of
public concern, arguing that it will create doctrinal uncertainty and offer a
new basis for individual employees to claim First Amendment protection.
I.

FIRST AMENDMENT RESTRICTIONS ON THE GOVERNMENT
AS EMPLOYER

Public employees do not leave their constitutional rights at the door to
the workplace. Nor do they have the same First Amendment freedoms as
citizens in general. This Part explains how the First Amendment operates in
a government workplace. In recognition of the government’s need to
supervise its workforce and conduct labor relations without turning every
matter into a constitutional case, the government receives significant latitude
to regulate its employees’ speech. As Section I.A describes, when the
government acts as employer, it must do so in a manner consistent with the
First Amendment, which generally proscribes restrictions on the freedom of
speech. Section I.B explains that public employee speech doctrine allows a
government employer flexibility to supervise its employees’ speech except
where employees express themselves as citizens on matters of public
concern. Historically, as Section I.C delineates, agency fees doctrine drew a
line around activities related to union representation and collective
bargaining. Until the Janus decision, a government employer could permit a
public sector union to impose an agency fee for expenses germane to
collective bargaining—but not political lobbying.
A. First Amendment Protections Generally
The First Amendment limits the federal government’s power to restrict
speech and likewise applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although the text of the First Amendment declares that “Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,” 16 the freedom of speech
is not absolute. Scholars observe that the Court has categorically provided
less protection under the First Amendment to some kinds of expression based
on the content of the speech. 17 Particularly harmful expression including
16

U.S. CONST. amend. I. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. famously wrote, “The most stringent
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
17 See, e.g., Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 625 (1990)
(describing the Court’s exclusion of obscenity from First Amendment protection).
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libel, obscenity, and incitement receives little or no First Amendment
protection. 18 Conversely, the Court affords speech that contributes to the
marketplace of ideas or promotes self-governance the highest levels of
protection. 19 In addition to these content-based distinctions, the First
Amendment also allows the government a freer hand to regulate speech in
certain spaces, including schools, prisons, and spaces on government
property not traditionally open to the public. 20 This extra operating room
allows the government to efficiently run schools, penological institutions,
and other government services. Thus, both the content and context of the
speech matter when examining government regulations of speech.
B. Public Employee Speech Doctrine
Government employers at all levels are bound to supervise their
employees in a manner consistent with the First Amendment. 21 For example,
although a private employee could be fired for speaking critically of the
President at work, a public employee may claim First Amendment
protection. 22 Yet the rights of public employees are not absolute. The Court
has recognized that, to efficiently provide public services, a government
employer must have more latitude to supervise its employees than when it
regulates its citizens. 23 If employees possessed an absolute right to freedom
of expression, it is easy to imagine how workplaces could become
unmanageable.

18 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (libel); Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15, 23–24 (1973) (obscenity); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (incitement).
19 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (noting that “speech on public issues occupies the
highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection” (quoting
Connick, 461 U.S. at 145)); see also Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils
of an Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 47 (1990) (critiquing such
content-based distinctions).
20 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (permitting regulation for legitimate penological
purposes); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 54 (1983) (applying rational
basis scrutiny to regulations limiting access to teacher mailboxes); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty.
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507, 509 (1969) (permitting regulation of student speech if the targeted speech
would materially and substantially disrupt the learning environment).
21 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 563, 574 (1968). In contrast, in the pre-Pickering era,
then-Massachusetts Supreme Court Justice Holmes proclaimed, “The petitioner may have a constitutional
right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.” McAuliffe v. Mayor of New
Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
22 See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 379–80 (1987) (holding a public employee had been
improperly fired for criticizing the President and his policies). After the assassination attempt on President
Ronald Reagan, McPherson had told a fellow employee, “If they go for him again, I hope they get him.”
Id. at 380.
23 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 565.
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The Court categorically excluded speech “pursuant to [public
employees’] official duties” from protection in Garcetti v. Ceballos. 24 For all
other speech, public employees must satisfy a two-part test in order to claim
First Amendment protection: (1) they must speak as citizens on matters of
public concern (not merely internal workplace or personal matters), and (2)
they must demonstrate that their interest in speaking outweighs the
government interest in limiting the speech. 25 This two-step test emerged
when the Court first recognized that public employees have free speech
rights. 26 In Pickering v. Board of Education, teacher Marvin Pickering was
fired after he wrote a letter to a local newspaper criticizing a proposed tax
increase and the local board of education’s spending priorities. 27 In
evaluating whether Pickering could claim constitutional protection, the
Court grappled with the tension between the government’s interest acting as
an employer and an individual’s interest in speaking. On the one hand, the
Court recognized that public employees contribute to informed decisionmaking about government services. 28 At the same time, the Court recognized
that a state has an interest in providing public services in an efficient manner
through its employees. 29 Thus ensuring that public employers would retain
significant latitude to supervise employees, the Pickering Court required
that, at the outset, employees must show they are speaking on a matter of
public concern before they can move to the second step, interest-balancing. 30
Fifteen years later, the Court clarified that employees must do more
than show that the content of their speech could be important to the public.
In Connick v. Myers, the Court held that an employee must demonstrate, with
the content, form, and context of the statement, that she was speaking as a
citizen on a matter of public concern, and not “as an employee upon matters

24 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (refusing to protect a deputy district attorney disciplined for writing a
memorandum recommending dismissal of a case based on government misconduct). If an employer can
show that the speech was within an employee’s job description, then the First Amendment simply does
not come into play. Id. The way the Court has defined workplace speech now prevents most cases from
even triggering First Amendment analysis. See Edward J. Schoen, Completing Government Speech’s
Unfinished Business: Clipping Garcetti’s Wings and Addressing Scholarship and Teaching, 43 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 537, 538 (2016).
25 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 566. Among Pickering’s complaints was the board’s decision to invest in a new athletic
field. Id.
28 Id. at 571–72. The Court observed that “free and open debate is vital to informed decision-making
by the electorate. . . . Accordingly, it is essential that [teachers] be able to speak out freely on such
questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal.” Id.
29 Id. at 568.
30 Id.
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only of personal interest.” 31 In Connick, an assistant district attorney alleged
she had been dismissed because she circulated a questionnaire to her
colleagues asking about office morale and whether employees felt pressured
to work on political campaigns. 32 Applying its multifactor test, the Court held
that the employee’s questionnaire was not designed to inform public debate
or bring wrongdoing to light—it was instead merely an extension of the
attorney’s ongoing dispute about being transferred. 33 As the Court explained,
“the First Amendment does not require a public office to be run as a
roundtable for employee complaints over internal office affairs.” 34 Even if
the content of the speech is potentially significant to the public, it will not be
protected if the form and context show that that the employee was really
making an internal complaint.
Thus, public employee speech doctrine has developed a restrictive
definition of matters of public concern, permitting government employers
wide latitude to supervise their employees. The Pickering–Connick
framework’s public concern test takes certain speech out of the picture by
categorizing it as outside constitutional protection. This classification allows
a government employer to function more like a private one by providing a
degree of predictability to government employers when they make internal,
day-to-day, and supervisory decisions. 35 Although a public employee
probably cannot be fired for criticizing the President, she still could be fired
for criticizing her boss. 36
C. Agency Fees Speech Doctrine
The latitude the Court usually accords public employers stands in stark
contrast to the Court’s recent holding in Janus that, in the agency fees
context, virtually all speech by a public sector labor union on behalf of
employees implicates the First Amendment. 37 As this Section describes,
public sector agency fees jurisprudence was fairly stable for nearly four

31

461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983) (emphasis added).
Id. at 141.
33 Id. at 148.
34 Id. at 149. Thus, an “employee grievance concerning internal office policy” is not entitled to
protection. Id. at 154. The Court observed that “government offices could not function if every
employment decision became a constitutional matter.” Id. at 143.
35 See id. at 149 (describing the need for government employers to supervise employees without
fearing the workplace will become a town hall meeting).
36 Compare Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 379–80 (1987) (employee wrongly dismissed for
criticizing the President), with Connick, 461 U.S. at 141 (employee legally fired for criticizing
supervisor).
37 See Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2472–77 (2018) (explaining that agency fees
overwhelmingly speak to issues of public concern).
32
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decades. First, in 1977, the Court established in Abood that government
employers could permit unions to charge agency fees for representing
nonmember employees so long as the fees were not used for political
lobbying. Subsequent cases refined Abood’s application. Then in 2012, the
Court indicated a willingness to reconsider the constitutionality of agency
fees. Now, in the case of Janus, the Court has held that even speech about
traditional topics of labor relations are a matter of public concern, and
therefore agency fees are unconstitutional because they compel such speech.
1. Unions and Agency Fees
A brief description of labor unions and their funding mechanisms may
first be helpful to understand the constitutional dimensions of agency fees.
A labor union represents employees in collective bargaining, resolving
grievances, and undertaking other forms of mutual aid. 38 Both in the private
and public sectors, workers form unions to improve their bargaining power
as they negotiate terms of employment with an employer. 39 Unions often ask
an employer to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement, a contract that
typically sets wages, benefits, and working conditions for all employees who
share a common workplace or work unit. 40 Employers may voluntarily
recognize a union as the representative of its employees or may be required
do so by statute when a majority of employees vote in favor of forming a
union. 41 Government employers were not permitted to recognize unions until
the 1950s, when states and the federal government passed statutes to
authorize it. 42 This decision reflected the policy judgment that unions could
facilitate improved labor relations, make negotiations more efficient, and
provide an employee voice in bargaining and conflict resolution. 43
Unions are funded by member dues, which are often deducted directly
from paychecks. 44 Public employee union membership is voluntary because
compulsory membership in such an organization would violate freedom of
38 KENNETH G. DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., LABOR LAW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORKPLACE 251–53
(2009).
39 Id. Before joining the Court, Justice Holmes wrote about the need for workers to negotiate
collectively with employers: “Combination on the one side is patent and powerful. Combination on the
other is the necessary and desirable counterpart, if the battle is to be carried on in a fair and equal way.”
Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (Mass. 1896).
40 DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 38, at 540–41.
41 Id. at 280–81, 370.
42 Id. at 83–85. Despite this relatively late start, public sector unions now have both more members
and higher rates of membership than their private counterparts. Id.
43 Id. at 3–7 (discussing the role of unions in labor relations generally); see also id. at 82–86
(describing state and federal public labor relations acts, including Wisconsin’s groundbreaking statute in
1959, President Kennedy’s executive order in 1962, and the federal statute in 1978).
44 Id. at 869; see, e.g., 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/6(f) (2005) (permitting union membership dues to be
deducted directly from employees’ paychecks).
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association. 45 Many state statutes require public sector unions to represent all
workers in a workplace, regardless of membership. 46 These states also
typically allow unions to charge nonmembers an agency fee (colloquially
known as a “fair share fee”) to cover the costs of representation, and agency
fee payers must receive the same wages and working conditions as a union
member. 47 Allowing unions to charge agency fees avoided a potential freerider problem in which workers could refuse to pay dues but still receive the
benefits of bargaining collectively with employers. 48 Until the Court’s
decision in Janus, most unions representing public sector workers were
agency shops funded by a mix of both union-member dues and nonmember
agency fees. 49
2. Drawing the Line: Germane to Collective Bargaining
Because unions speak on behalf of employees, agency fees that fund
unions trigger potential free speech concerns. Spending money to express an
idea is a form of protected speech recognized by the Court in the contexts of
campaign spending 50 and compelled commercial speech. 51 Because spending
money can be expressive, requiring an individual to pay a fee can unlawfully

45 N. PETER LAREAU, 2 LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW § 25.08 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. rev.
ed. 2018).
46 DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 38, at 892–94.
47 Id. at 868. These agency fee provisions now all appear to be unconstitutional under Janus. See
Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Ruling Delivers a Sharp Blow to Labor Unions, N.Y. TIMES (June 27,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/us/politics/supreme-court-unions-organized-labor.html
[https://perma.cc/HS4N-HQ4U] (predicting the Janus decision will affect public sector unions
nationally).
48 DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 38, at 867. The issue of “union security,” the question of whether
a union must be the exclusive bargaining representative in order to operate, has been subject to much
debate. See id. at 867–68. Professor Mancur Olson argued that, without compelled membership, no
“rational worker . . . [would] voluntarily contribute to a (large) union providing a collective benefit since
he alone would not perceptibly strengthen the union, and since he would get the benefits of any union
achievements whether or not he supported the union.” MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 88 (1971). On the other hand, others argue that
the unions representing federal employees demonstrate that it is possible for unions to survive without
agency fees. Compare Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2466 (2018) (concluding that
federal employee unions show that agency fees are unnecessary for labor union survival), with Brief of
Amici Curiae Economists and Professors of Law and Economics in Support of Respondents at 21–25,
Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (No. 16-1466) (arguing that agency fees are necessary for unions to operate
effectively).
49 See LAREAU, supra note 45, § 25.08.
50 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (holding that expenditure limits on political candidates
unconstitutionally restricted their speech).
51 United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 415–16 (2001) (holding unconstitutional a
regulation that compelled producers to fund advertisements promoting the sale of mushrooms).
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compel speech. 52 Compelled speech can violate the First Amendment as
surely as can a restraint on speech; 53 for example, a school may not require a
student to salute a flag or to say the Pledge of Allegiance. 54 Thus, the Court’s
jurisprudence has established that public sector agency fees raise
constitutional concerns.
In 1977, the Court first considered the constitutionality of agency fees
for public sector employees. In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,
teachers challenged the state statute authorizing mandatory agency fees for
employees who did not join the union. 55 The plaintiffs argued that requiring
them to pay agency fees violated their First Amendment rights. 56 The
plaintiffs objected not only to paying for both political and ideological
activities to which they were opposed (including legislative lobbying and the
support of political candidates) but also to paying for the act of collective
bargaining itself. 57 As in Pickering, the Court recognized that, when the
government acts as an employer, its interests in dealing with its workforce
are weightier than when it regulates its citizens.58 The Court held that the
government has strong interests in the efficiency and simplicity of dealing
with one exclusive representative, and in avoiding confusion and strife
resulting from dealing with rival unions and multiple collective bargaining
agreements. 59 It acknowledged that the teachers paying agency fees had First
Amendment interests as well but dismissed them as being no weightier than
those of their private sector counterparts, whose compelled agency fees it
had already blessed in Railway Employees’ Department v. Hanson. 60
The Court ultimately upheld the constitutionality of agency fees by
distinguishing between expenses germane to collective bargaining and those
52 See id. at 411 (observing that “First Amendment values are at serious risk if the government can
compel a particular citizen, or a discrete group of citizens, to pay special subsidies for speech on the side
that it favors”).
53 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (“[T]he right of freedom of thought protected by
the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain
from speaking at all.”).
54 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (observing that “[i]f there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by
word or act their faith therein”).
55 431 U.S. 209, 209 (1977).
56 Id. at 213. The objecting teachers alleged that the union was engaged in “activities and programs
which are economic, political, professional, scientific and religious in nature of which Plaintiffs do not
approve, and in which they will have no voice.” Id.
57 Id. at 212–13.
58 See id. at 228–30.
59 Id. at 220–21. The Court also observed that exclusive representation “prevents inter-union rivalries
from creating dissension within the work force.” Id.
60 Id. at 229–30.
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for unrelated political lobbying, speech on behalf of political candidates, or
advancement of unrelated ideological causes. 61 So long as the charges were
for the costs of actually representing the fee-payer, agency fees did not
violate the fee-payer’s rights. The line drawn between activities germane to
collective bargaining and political lobbying did not depend on the distinction
between what is political and what is not, however. Quite the opposite: the
Court acknowledged that unions engage in activities with political
implications. 62 It clarified that the “critical constitutional inquiry” was not
whether the activities were “political.” 63 The Court acknowledged that
employees might view “the cause of unionism” itself as a political matter but
found it significant that the collective bargaining agreement did not compel
the employees to join the union, espouse its cause, or participate in any
way. 64 Thus, the Court squarely considered and rejected the plaintiffs’ key
argument that public sector agency fees violate the First Amendment because
collective bargaining is inherently political.65
Subsequent litigation refined what expenses should be considered
germane to collective bargaining. Beginning with Chicago Teachers Union
v. Hudson, decided nine years after Abood, the Court held that unions must
provide adequate information and procedural safeguards to agency fee
payers to minimize the risk of infringing on free speech rights. 66 Unions
complied by providing annual “Hudson notices” with itemized lists of
expenses charged to fee-payers. 67 The Hudson Court also held that agency
fees could only be used for payments to state and national union affiliates if
the activities benefited the nonmembers. 68 The Court extended this holding
in the 1991 case of Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, when it decided that
unions could charge agency fee payers for activities that did not directly
benefit the bargaining unit, but “[t]here must be some indication that the
payment is for services that may ultimately inure to the benefit of the
members of the local union.” 69 According to the Court, it would cross the
61

Id. at 235–36.
Id. at 231 (observing that “[t]here can be no quarrel with the truism that because public employee
unions attempt to influence governmental policymaking, their activities—and the views of members who
disagree with them—may be properly termed political”).
63 Id. at 232.
64 Id. at 212.
65 Id. at 227–29.
66 475 U.S. 292, 309 (1986).
67 LAREAU, supra note 45, § 25.08.
68 Hudson, 475 U.S. at 309.
69 Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 524 (1991) (holding that while the union “need not
demonstrate a direct and tangible impact upon the dissenting employee’s unit,” the local union does not
have “carte blanche to expend dissenters’ dollars for bargaining activities wholly unrelated to the
employees in their unit”).
62
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line to “charge objecting employees for a direct donation or interest-free loan
to an unrelated bargaining unit for the purpose of promoting employee rights
or unionism generally.” 70 Nor could the union charge nonmembers for its
own public relations expenses or promoting workers’ rights generally. 71
Until Janus, the law appeared fairly settled as to which expenses were
chargeable for agency fees. 72 Unions were permitted to charge for costs
associated with (1) negotiating and administering the collective bargaining
agreement, including processing grievances, (2) the union’s national
convention, (3) the union’s social activities, (4) certain litigation expenses,
and (5) union publications, so long as they reported on other chargeable
activities. 73 In the last ten years, however, new plaintiffs called into question
the underlying holding in Abood.
3. An Invitation to Challenge Agency Fees
Nearly four decades of agency fees jurisprudence had focused union
critics’ battle on narrow questions of chargeability, notice, accounting,
timing, and procedures for objecting. 74 Then, in a pair of cases, Justice
Samuel Alito laid the foundation for reassessing Abood’s distinction between
collective bargaining and political lobbying. The Court first suggested it was
open to reconsidering its precedent in Knox v. Service Employees
International Union. 75 In that case, the union had levied a temporary fee
increase in order to oppose a ballot initiative in California that would have
made it more difficult for unions to charge fees for political purposes. 76 The
Court held that even a temporary fee increase that is subsequently refunded
violated agency fee payers’ rights. 77 Justice Alito, who wrote for the
majority, did not stop there. In dicta, he questioned whether collective
bargaining was distinguishable from political lobbying for First Amendment
70

Id.
Id.
72 As Justice Elena Kagan observed in her dissent in Janus, only a handful of cases on chargeability
reached the Court after Abood. Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2498 (2018) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting); see also Martin H. Malin, The Evolving Law of Agency Shop in the Public Sector, 50 OHIO
ST. L.J. 855, 861 (1989) (arguing that the chargeability test was not consistent with the narrow tailoring
required of an infringement on a fundamental constitutional right).
73 See Malin, supra note 72, at 861–62; see also Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political
Speech and Association Rights After Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023, 1038 (2013)
(explaining how to apply the three-part chargeability test).
74 See Malin, supra note 72, at 861–63.
75 567 U.S. 298 (2012).
76 Id. at 304–05. The ballot proposition would have required affirmative consent from employees
before unions could charge fees for political purposes. Id. at 303–04. The fee increase was also used to
attempt to elect a sympathetic governor and legislature. The union failed to provide an opportunity for
employees to opt out of the fees, although they did offer a full refund. Id. at 305.
77 Id. at 321.
71
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purposes. 78 He pointedly observed that “a public-sector union takes many
positions during collective bargaining that have powerful political and civic
consequences” and characterized agency fees as “a form of compelled
speech and association that imposes a ‘significant impingement on First
Amendment rights.’” 79 Although the Court did not officially revisit Abood,
observers saw Knox as a signal that the Court was ready to reconsider its
precedent. 80
Two years later, in Harris v. Quinn, the Court declined to extend Abood
to allow mandatory fees in an unusual quasi-public union of home care
workers. 81 Writing again for the majority, Justice Alito opined that Abood
had ignored the difficulty of distinguishing between collective bargaining
and political lobbying. 82 As he saw it, “in the public sector, both collectivebargaining and political advocacy and lobbying are directed at the
government.” 83 According to Justice Alito, Abood failed to understand that,
“[i]n the public sector, core issues such as wages, pensions, and benefits are
important political issues, but that is generally not so in the private sector.”84
He thus characterized the proper agency fees inquiry as asking not whether
the expense is germane to collective bargaining but rather whether the
activity has political implications. Although the Court held the agency fee
arrangement unconstitutional, it reserved the question of Abood’s
constitutionality for another case. 85
4. Redrawing the Contours of Workplace Speech
A new wave of plaintiffs accepted the invitation Justice Alito extended
in Knox and Harris. 86 In 2015, the Court granted certiorari in Friedrichs v.
California Teachers Ass’n to directly reconsider the Abood precedent on the

78

See id. at 321–22.
Id. at 310–11 (quoting Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 455 (1984)); see
Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 73, at 1070 (observing that the majority opinion in Knox “casts doubt
on the location of the line between chargeable germane expenses and nonchargeable political expenses”).
80 See, e.g., Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 73, at 1067 (observing that “the Court’s language and
reasoning call[ed] into question the very existence of collective bargaining based on principles of
exclusivity and majority rule”).
81 Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2639 (2014).
82 See id. at 2632–34. Justice Alito’s lengthy dicta is particularly notable because the Court also
expressly determined that Abood did not control the outcome of the case. See id. at 2639.
83 Id. at 2632–33.
84 Id. at 2632.
85 Id. at 2644. The case involved an unusual union of “quasi-public” home healthcare workers hired
by private clients but statutorily deemed employees for purposes of union membership only. Id. at 2634–
35. The Court characterized its holding as a decision not to extend Abood. See id. at 2644.
86 See, e.g., Hill v. SEIU, 850 F.3d 861 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 446 (2017);
Complaint at 4, Yohn v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No. 8:17-cv-00202 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2017).
79
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constitutionality of agency fees. 87 The Court deadlocked 4–4 after Justice
Antonin Scalia’s death; thus, the lower court decision upholding Abood
remained in place. Two years later, the Court granted certiorari on the same
question in Janus. 88 The question in the case was whether to overrule Abood
and declare public sector agency fees unconstitutional. 89
In Janus, the Court determined that agency fees are a far more egregious
impingement on the First Amendment than the Abood Court had previously
recognized. 90 Once again writing for the Court, Justice Alito explained that
compelled speech is an even greater injury to free speech than a mere
restraint on speech. 91 He next undertook a wholesale reconsideration of the
government interest in labor peace and the prevention of free riders. 92
Contrary to the holding in Abood, Justice Alito concluded that agency fees
are not essential to prevent employees from accepting the benefits of union
representation without paying for it, and that agency fee funding is not
necessary to ensure that unions can function as an exclusive representative
of all employees. 93 According to the Court, it would not cost significantly
more to represent non-paying employees in collective bargaining and
grievances, and the benefit unions would derive outweighs the burden. 94 The
Court applied the standard it announced in Knox, exacting scrutiny, to decide
whether the government interest in agency fees is sufficient to justify the
impingement on speech. 95 The Court found that the government employer
lacks the requisite compelling interest in the fees because—as a factual
matter—agency fees are not necessary to preserve labor peace.96 Thus,
agency fees cannot survive exacting scrutiny in the public sector.
Justice Alito further explained that Abood was not only wrong about the
government interest in agency fees but was also incorrect about the nature of
union speech. In his discussion of why stare decisis did not counsel against
overruling Abood, Justice Alito explained that the line Abood attempted to
draw between speech germane to collective bargaining and political

87

Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016).
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at (i), Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (No.
16-1466); Brief for Petitioner at 11, Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (No. 16-1466).
89 Supra note 88.
90 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464–65 (2018).
91 Id. at 2464.
92 Id. at 2465–69.
93 Id. at 2466–68. Justice Kagan sharply contested the Court’s conclusions here in dissent. Id. at
2489–91 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
94 Id. at 2467–69 (majority opinion).
95 Id. at 2464–66, 2469.
96 Id. at 2465–66.
88
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lobbying was fraught with conceptual difficulty. 97 As he explained, Abood
was logically flawed because, in the context of public sector collective
bargaining, wages, pensions, and benefits are “important political issues.” 98
Thus, the Court concluded that all union speech that is compelled through
agency fees is on matters of public concern. 99
But Justice Alito did not end his analysis there. He continued on to
evaluate whether agency fees could be alternatively upheld under public
employee speech doctrine’s Pickering framework. Although he initially
dismissed Pickering as a “poor fit,” he went on to conduct a formal public
employee speech doctrine analysis, concluding that agency fees still would
not be upheld because they speak to government expenditures and other
matters of public concern. 100 First, he evaluated whether collective
bargaining speaks on a matter of public concern. 101 Justice Alito observed
that the state of Illinois was in a budget crisis and that its expenditures on
public employees and retirees were a large portion of its spending. 102 As a
result, the question of whether to reduce spending drove collective
bargaining positions on both sides. 103 Thus, speech about state expenditures
was a matter of public concern. 104
Second, Justice Alito considered whether union speech on
noneconomic issues could also be of public concern. He observed that other
topics are discussed in collective bargaining, such as “education, child
welfare, healthcare, and minority rights.” 105 For example, he noted that, when
educators are engaged in collective bargaining, the terms of employment also
affect education policy, including seniority, merit pay, tenure, evaluation,
and dismissal. 106 Justice Alito suggested that even grievances, in which
97 Id. at 2480. One factor the Court considers in determining whether to overrule a prior case is the
workability of the rule it had previously established. Id. at 2481–82.
98 Id. at 2480–81.
99 Id.; see also id. at 2460 (“We conclude that this arrangement violates the free speech rights of
nonmembers by compelling them to subsidize private speech on matters of substantial public concern.”).
100 Id. at 2472–77. Justice Alito initially argued that Pickering requires “shoehorn[ing]” a test
intended for cases involving one employee and single supervisory decisions. Id. at 2472–73. Because a
public sector union may represent thousands of employees, its demands are more likely to implicate
matters of public concern. Id. Further, because union speech is mouthed by a private party, as opposed to
the employee in the course of official duties, Pickering’s interest-balancing step would require an
adjustment to ensure greater protection. Id. at 2473.
101 Id. at 2474. Here, he expanded on the seeds planted in Harris, where the Court had noted that
Illinois’s state expenditures, particularly on employee benefits, are “a matter of great public concern.” Id.
(quoting Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2642–43 (2014)).
102 Id. at 2474–75.
103 Id. at 2475.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 2475–76.
106 Id.
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unions enforce the legally binding, agreed-upon terms of an employment
contract, “may be of substantial public importance and may be directed at
the public square.” 107 While he left open the possibility that some union
speech might be of only private interest, Justice Alito noted that on balance
“the union speech at issue in this case is overwhelmingly of substantial
public concern.” 108
When the Court delivered its answer as to the constitutionality of
agency fees, it did not address the doctrinal repercussions on public
employee speech more generally. Part II considers these repercussions and
argues that, because the Court based its reasoning on the holding that unions
and collective bargaining speak on matters of public concern, Janus will blur
the previously stable lines in its sister doctrine.
II. THE INTERTWINED NATURE OF AGENCY FEES AND PUBLIC
EMPLOYEE SPEECH
Two key holdings in Janus have implications for public employee
speech doctrine. First, the Court’s declarations on matters of public concern
will reverberate in public employee speech doctrine because the decision
offered a new reading of Pickering, the core public employee speech case.
Second, the Court’s reasoning as to why Abood was wrongly decided has
repercussions for both agency fees and public employee speech because the
two doctrines are interdependent. Thus, even if the Court had not offered a
fresh interpretation of Pickering, its pronouncements about the inherently
political nature of union speech in Janus and its other two recent agency fees
decisions would disrupt public employee speech doctrine.
In this Part, Section II.A details how the Janus decision has redefined
what constitutes a matter of public concern for public employees. Section
II.B demonstrates that public employee speech doctrine and agency fees
jurisprudence are not only parallel but also interdependent. Section II.C
evaluates whether the holding in Janus can be confined to agency fees. It
concludes that the Court has failed to provide a limiting principle to confine
the Janus decision to agency fees speech, and therefore, the Janus decision
will shift how to analyze workplace speech in the public sector.

107

Id. at 2476–77 (internal quotation marks omitted). He cited an example of a union lawsuit to
compel appropriations to pay for public employee wages, although he did not make clear whether it was
the impact on expenditures or the public’s likely interest in the issue that made it of public concern. Id.
108 Id. at 2477.
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A. Redefining Matters of Public Concern
The Court in Janus offered a new reading of Pickering that expansively
redefines matters of public concern. Writing for the majority, Justice Alito
explained that, through collective bargaining and contract enforcement,
public sector unions take positions on employee pay, benefits, evaluation,
dismissal, grievances, and a variety of other workplace matters.109 Justice
Alito contended that these topics implicate fundamental policy decisions and
questions of how to allocate government expenditures, issues the Court in
Harris had already determined are of “great public concern.” 110 He further
explained that unions also express views in collective bargaining on
important subjects like education policy, child welfare, and healthcare. 111
Taken as a whole, the Court predicted that if the Pickering public employee
speech test were applied to union speech, it would “overwhelmingly” be of
public concern. 112
The Court’s new interpretation of Pickering thus eliminates a
categorical presumption that “workplace speech” is outside the bounds of
First Amendment protection. Beginning with Connick, cases interpreting
Pickering had previously understood certain types of speech as categorically
of only private interest. 113 In some employee speech cases, individuals are
disciplined for speech that is neither of public concern nor directed at the
workplace. For example, the Court held that a police officer who produced
sexually explicit videos off the job was neither speaking about his working
conditions nor expressing a view on a topic of importance to the
community. 114 However, another significant subset of public employee
expression has been “workplace speech,” matters that are focused on the
employer–employee relationship or more generally on the internal
operations of a government office. 115 When employees have complained
about internal office policy, criticized a supervisor, or raised other workplace
grievances, they have been consistently denied protection because their

109

See supra Section I.C.
See supra Section I.C.
111 See supra Section I.C.
112 See supra Section I.C.
113 See supra Section I.B.
114 City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004) (holding that a police officer did not speak
on a matter of public concern when he made sexually explicit videos while wearing a police uniform).
115 Justice Kagan aptly described such expression as “core workplace speech” in her Janus dissent
and as “internal workplace speech” in her Harris dissent. See Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct.
2448, 2493 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting); Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2655 (2014) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
110
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expression was employment-related, not of public concern. 116 This left a
great deal of speech outside the bounds of the First Amendment. 117
Until Janus, the line had been fairly stable. While scholars have
observed that Pickering and Connick provided little guidance as to the line
between workplace speech and a matter of public concern, 118 courts reached
an equilibrium, routinely classifying most speech about traditional
employee–management issues as internal to the workplace and therefore not
protected. 119 Thus, modern public employee speech doctrine has been
organized around the principle that some things employees say are so clearly
internal to the workplace that they do not trigger First Amendment
protections.
While the Pickering–Connick public concern test focused on whether
speech is directed at the workplace,120 the Court’s new reading of Pickering
asks instead whether speech is of importance to the public. In so doing, the
Janus Court set aside the other two factors it had established in Connick, the
form and the context of the speech, and focused almost exclusively on its
content. 121 The Court’s omission was no accident. There is little in either the
form or context of collective bargaining and grievances to indicate that they
are aimed at the public square—employment contract negotiations and
enforcement actions take place behind closed doors. In a sharp rebuke of this
divergence, Justice Elena Kagan observed that the inquiry in Janus is now
“whether the public is, or should be, interested in a government employee’s
speech” as opposed to “whether that speech is about and directed to the
workplace—as contrasted with the broader public square.” 122 Janus
represents a significant shift in how to read Pickering: instead of asking
whether the speech is about a workplace matter, the Court asks whether the
speech is of interest to the public at large.

116

Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2493; Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2655.
The Court does not have a single, precise term for the converse of “matters of public concern” in
the public employment context. It usually describes speech that does not trigger public concern as
“private” or of “personal interest.” See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983). There is
potential for confusion from describing speech in a public workplace as “private.”
118 Post, supra note 17, at 668 (“Although the ‘public concern’ test rests on a clean and superficially
attractive rationale, the Court has offered virtually no analysis to develop its logic.”).
119 See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 18:10 (rev. ed. 2018).
Generally, courts have considered the topics of traditional employee–management relations about hours,
duties, overtime pay, evaluation, and conflicts with supervisors outside of public concern.
120 See supra Section I.B.
121 See supra Section I.C.
122 Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2495 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting). In contrast,
Justice Kagan argued, the Pickering–Connick inquiry had “asked whether the speech was truly of the
workplace—addressed to it, made in it, and (most of all) about it.” Id.
117
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Janus not only broadens this definition but also makes it even less
precise. Even before Janus, scholars have noted that Pickering and Connick
provided little guidance as to the definition of a matter of public concern,
and results have been unpredictable ex ante. 123 One scholar argues, for
example, that the test is subjective and requires courts to make problematic
judgments on the social utility of speech. 124 Now, Janus retreats from a longestablished line that had excluded internal workplace speech from First
Amendment protection. Accordingly, all matters are back on the table for
public employees, so long as they are “a subject of legitimate news interest;
that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public at
the time of publication.” 125 This makes protected speech in the government
workplace closer to the protections that citizens claim in defamation law,
which allows essentially any newsworthy expression to receive protection—
certainly a broad category in the contemporary media environment. 126 In the
context of defamation law, Professor Robert C. Post contends that, although
the public concern test is superficially clean and attractive, the Court has
offered virtually no analysis to guide judges how to apply it. 127 In this area
of law, matters of public concern now encompass both topics relevant to
democratic decision-making and those that the public actually discusses, like
celebrity gossip. 128 The Janus decision has thus moved in the direction of a
far more expansive view of matters of public concern in the government
workplace.
B. The Intertwined Nature of Agency Fees and Public Employee Speech
As this Note argues, agency fees doctrine and public employee speech
doctrine are interdependent because they govern precisely the same
employees, the same employers, and largely the same topics of speech. Thus,
123

See, e.g., Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing Public Employee Speech, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1007,
1027 (2005); Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial Prerogative,
77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 58 (2008).
124 Toni M. Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector Workplace, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (1987) (“[U]nder Connick the courts must assess the social utility of employee
speech twice—first, in determining whether the speech falls within the amendment, and again in
determining whether speech within the amendment can be restricted.”).
125 City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004) (holding that a police officer did not speak
on a matter of public concern when he made sexually explicit videos while wearing a police uniform).
126 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–81 (1964).
127 Post, supra note 17, at 668–69 (“Indeed, as matters now stand, the test of ‘public concern’
‘amounts to little more than a message to judges and attorneys that no standards are necessary because
they will, or should, know a public concern when they see it.’” (quoting Arlen W. Langvardt, Public
Concern Revisited: A New Role for an Old Doctrine in the Constitutional Law of Defamation, 21 VAL.
U. L. REV. 241, 259 (1987))).
128 Id. at 668–74.
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even if Justice Alito had not directly addressed Pickering, the core public
employee speech case, the Court’s decision to overrule Abood would have
had repercussions in its sister doctrine. Janus merely cements a view the
Court expressed in two prior cases that the core topics of union speech are
inherently political.
The Court recognizes that “the government as employer indeed has far
broader powers than does the government as sovereign.” 129 These additional
powers give a government employer greater latitude in relation to its
employees in multiple dimensions of employee relations, including search
and seizure, due process, and speech. 130 This is grounded in the recognition
that the Court has “long held the view that there is a crucial difference, with
respect to constitutional analysis, between the government exercising ‘the
power to regulate or license, as lawmaker,’ and the government acting ‘as
proprietor, to manage [its] internal operation.’” 131 In the context of public
employee speech, the government may operate with wide latitude so long as
an employee is not speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern. What
is more, both agency fees doctrine and public employee speech doctrine
depended until now on delineating between speech on matters that are
internal to the workplace (and thus unprotected) and speech on matters
transcending the workplace (and thus protected). Any changes to this line are
likely to affect both areas of law—they must cohere or risk creating
inconsistencies.
Others recognize the overlap in approach to First Amendment linedrawing between the two doctrines. In Justice Kagan’s view, compelled
agency fees are in fact a subset of “the government’s regulation of its
workforce.” 132 In her dissent in Janus, she observed that both Pickering and
Abood drew a line of constitutional importance to separate expression related
to the government’s managerial interests from those that are not.133 Likewise,
in their amicus brief in Janus, Professors Charles Fried and Robert C. Post
argued that “[p]ublic-sector bargaining regimes involve the same state

129 Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 598 (2008) (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S.
661, 671 (1994) (plurality opinion)).
130 See id. at 598–600 (describing the Court’s holdings giving public employers latitude vis-à-vis
warrant requirements, due process protections from discharge, and regulations of public employee
speech).
131 Id. at 598 (alteration in original) (quoting Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896 (1961)) (holding that a class-of-one theory of equal protection is not
cognizable in the public employment context).
132 Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2654 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
133 Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2492–93 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting).

905

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

managerial prerogatives to which the Court has expressed deference” in its
public employee speech jurisprudence. 134
Because the two jurisprudential areas are so closely related, the Court’s
recent pronouncements on the political nature of agency fees will alter how
public employee speech doctrine classifies workplace expression. In its trio
of agency fees cases in Knox, Harris, and Janus, the Court has repeatedly
expressed the view that collective bargaining, or union speech generally, is
inherently political and thus implicates the First Amendment. According to
the Court, it is difficult to distinguish collective bargaining from political
lobbying, 135 it has “powerful political and civic consequences,” 136 and it
“involves inherently ‘political’ speech.” 137 Further, public employee “wages,
pensions, and benefits,” the topics of collective bargaining, “are important
political issues.” 138 These statements amount to a determination that when
public employees speak about the traditional topics of collective bargaining,
and when unions speak, this expression is categorically a matter of public
concern. Unlike speech of merely private concern, these topics now trigger
the potential for First Amendment protection.
C. In Search of a Limiting Principle
Janus fails to provide a limiting principle that would confine a newly
expansive definition of matters of public concern from altering public
employee speech doctrine. While Justice Alito explained why he believed
Pickering does not apply to Janus, 139 he did not address the converse: Why
would Janus not affect Pickering? Indeed, Justice Alito acknowledged that,
under the right facts, employees who are reprimanded for agitating on
134 Brief for Amici Curiae Charles Fried & Robert C. Post in Support of Neither Party, supra note
14, at 7.
135 See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2632–34; Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 321 (2012).
136 Knox, 567 U.S. at 310.
137 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2480 (quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd. Of Educ, 431 U.S. 209, 226 (1977)). The
Court considered and rejected some of these arguments in Abood in 1977. Justice Powell, concurring in
the judgment in Abood, failed to persuade the Court that “no principled distinction” existed between a
public sector union and a political candidate or committee. Abood, 431 U.S. at 256 (Powell, J., concurring
in the judgment). The majority in Abood observed that collective bargaining “may be properly termed
political” because it constitutes an “attempt to influence governmental policymaking.” Id. at 231. Thus,
the latitude the Court provided to accommodate the government interest in labor peace in Abood was no
accident.
138 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2480 (quoting Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2632).
139 Id. at 2472–74, 2477 n.23. The Court was well aware that many insist that the Pickering public
employee speech framework, with its matter of public concern test, should apply to agency fees, or that
the frameworks should at least cohere. The State of Illinois made this argument in Harris. 134 S. Ct. at
2641. Justice Kagan argued for it in her dissents in Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2653–56 (Kagan, J., dissenting),
and Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2492–97 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Numerous briefs in Friedrichs and Janus
discussed the issue. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2469–71 (majority opinion).
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workplace topics like merit pay or health benefits could have a First
Amendment case. 140
Nonetheless, there might be sound reasons why public employee speech
doctrine need not shift, despite the Court’s declarations about the public
concern test. First, it might be significant that agency fees affect public
expenditures. Second, it could be important that agency fees aggregate
speech through a labor union and thus make it more powerful than the same
message from an individual speaker. As discussed below, however, neither
of these features is exclusive to agency fees, and consequently, Janus cannot
avoid generating serious problems for a government employer supervising
its workforce.
First, agency fees could be special because they affect public
expenditures. According to the Court, public sector unions helped achieve
generous retirement packages, contributing to the State of Illinois’s “$160
billion in unfunded pension and retiree healthcare liabilities.” 141 For this
reason, the Court declared that these expenditures are “matters . . . of great
public concern.” 142 No threshold has been identified below which a public
expenditure would be too small to satisfy the public concern test. 143 After all,
Janus declared agency fees for collective bargaining are unconstitutional
even for the tiniest of unions. In such a context, the dollar amounts are likely
to be quite small, implying that the price tag of a proposal does not have
constitutional significance. It also is unclear whether expenditures need have
any policy implications beyond an impact on public finances before they
trigger public concern. 144 Agency fees sometimes speak to very small public
expenditures or ones that do not clearly implicate any policy consequences
beyond government spending. Government workers, particularly if they are
speaking as a group of two or more, could demonstrate that their expression
takes positions with similar implications for public expenditures. Just as
140

Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2477 n.23.
Id. at 2474–75.
142 Id. at 2475.
143 As Justice Kagan said in Harris, “[N]owhere has the Court ever suggested, as the majority does
today, . . . that if a certain dollar amount is at stake (but how much, exactly?), the constitutional treatment
of an employee’s expression becomes any different.” 134 S. Ct. at 2655 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
144 Consider, for example, a hypothetical posed at oral argument in Friedrichs as to whether a
mileage reimbursement policy negotiated in collective bargaining would satisfy the public concern test.
Counsel for Friedrichs suggested that mileage reimbursement is a topic of public bargaining that does
not present a policy question, presumably because it is so obviously uncontroversial or unimportant. Yet
at least some Justices appeared to think even such a topic would be a matter of public concern. Chief
Justice John Roberts insisted, “That’s money. That’s how much money is going to have to be paid to the
teachers. . . . And the amount of money that’s going to be allocated to public education as opposed to
public housing, welfare benefits, that’s always a public policy issue.” See Transcript of Oral Argument at
46–47, Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (No. 14-915).
141
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unions discuss wages, benefits, and workplace matters with policy
implications, so too can public employees outside of a union context. Thus,
agency fees do not uniquely implicate public expenditures.
Nor should speech satisfy the public concern test solely on the basis that
it implicates public expenditures. A few pennies or dollars should not by
itself turn workplace speech into matters of public concern. Indeed, in
Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, another First Amendment case, the Court
held there was no matter of public concern implicated when a police chief
demanded $338 in overtime pay and criticized the operations of the borough
council. 145 It seems a stretch to argue that such mileage reimbursement would
categorically meet the Court’s requirement, especially if the policy extended
to a small number of employees or required only minimal expenditures. 146
Second, it might be significant that the speech is either aggregated or
that it affects a large number of employees. 147 Agency fees are aggregated
with union dues across an entire bargaining unit and combined with member
dues to fund a union. Together, this could magnify the effect of the speech,
whether it is about government expenditures or public policy issues.
Although an agency fee payer might only contribute a few hundred dollars
per year, the effect of the speech may be amplified beyond the nominal
amount. For example, in Harris, the Court asserted that when a “powerful
union” speaks on topics affecting public expenditures like Medicaid funding,
such speech is different than cases like Connick where the expression was a
“matter[] of only private concern” and dealt with “one employee’s
dissatisfaction.” 148 As the Court noted in Janus, unions may have thousands
of members, and thus, a demand for a 5% raise for many thousands of
employees could have a serious impact on the state budget. 149
Aggregation, however, is not a workable line because then the relative
size or strength of the union would have constitutional implications. Some
bargaining units for large urban school districts have tens of thousands of

145 564 U.S. 379, 384, 398–99 (2011) (suggesting the police chief’s demand was a “purely private
concern” and remanding to the district court for findings).
146 City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–85 (2004) (holding that a police officer did not speak
on a matter of public concern when he made sexually explicit videos while wearing a police uniform).
147 At oral argument in Friedrichs, Justice Kennedy suggested that the crucial difference from
Pickering is that agency fees compel a group of people to speak, as opposed to restricting individual
employee speech. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 144, at 56. Justice Kennedy contended, “[I]f
you use Pickering in this case, you’re committing error of composition. You’re comparing a whole group
of persons who have their views coerced or compelled against one person that . . . Pickering is just
inapplicable on that . . . ground.” Id.
148 Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2643.
149 Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2472 (2018).
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members, 150 but state and federal statutes allow unions to form even in a tiny
public workplace. For example, the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act
allows just five employees to form a bargaining unit.151 Adjustments in
wages and benefits for such a small group of workers seem unlikely to have
a significant effect on the state, yet for First Amendment purposes, the fees
spent to fund small unions are treated no differently than those funding a
large union. The Janus decision does not prohibit agency fees for only large
or influential unions. Furthermore, two or more public employees speaking
as a group could demonstrate that their expression, like union speech, is just
as aggregated and significant as that of a small bargaining unit.
A third and final feature of agency fees that could make it
distinguishable from other forms of speech is that it is compelled speech.
One of the Janus Court’s central criticisms of Abood is that it failed to
understand that, when agency fees compel speech, the effect is a greater
impingement than restricted speech. 152 However, this is a difference of
degree, not kind. The distinction can explain the proper level of scrutiny
(exacting) and the required weight of the government interest
(compelling). 153 This difference would not make it easier to satisfy the
threshold question of whether the expression was on a matter of public
concern. 154
What now is left to protect the managerial interests of a government
employer? First, public employee speech doctrine still appears to
categorically exclude speech in furtherance of official duties from First
Amendment protection. 155 Second, even if more speech can clear Pickering’s
public concern test, the framework continues to protect managerial interests
at its second step. One scholar observes that the Pickering test provides the

150

For example, the Chicago Teachers Union represents nearly 25,000 members. About Us,
CHICAGO TEACHERS UNION, https://www.ctunet.com/about [https://perma.cc/4VAM-N7NL].
151 Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315 (2005). The statute reduced the
minimum number of employees in a bargaining unit from thirty-five to five. Id.
152 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2473–74.
153 See id. at 2464–65. The level of scrutiny for agency fees is somewhere between exacting and
strict, and the government must show a compelling interest. Id. at 2477 (“The exacting scrutiny standard
we apply in this case was developed in the context of commercial speech, another area where the
government has traditionally enjoyed greater-than-usual power to regulate speech.”). Janus reserved the
question of what level of scrutiny applies to agency fees. Id. at 2464–65.
154 Similarly, in defamation law, the burden for proving libel is heightened when the plaintiff is a
public figure, but the definition of matters of public concern remains the same. See N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (imposing an actual malice standard for libel of public officials).
155 See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2474 (describing Garcetti as relevant when employees are “paid to write
or speak for the purpose of furthering the interests of their employers”); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S.
410, 421 (2006).
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government significant latitude at the second step.156 She has argued for
discarding the public concern test entirely on the grounds that the test is
subjective and requires courts to make problematic judgments on the social
utility of speech. 157 Even before Janus, the results of the public concern test
have been unpredictable ex ante. 158 Unfortunately for the government
employer, if they must rely on Pickering’s interest-balancing step to regulate
speech, the results are likely to be even less predictable because balancing
an employee’s interest in her speech against the employer’s interest in
restricting it is a highly fact-intensive inquiry. 159 Thus, post-Janus employee
speech claims are more likely to proceed further in litigation.160
The Court itself has recognized a need for consistency within First
Amendment doctrine. The majority in Knox expressed concern as to whether
agency fees received anomalous treatment. 161 The Court’s insistence on
greater uniformity in First Amendment jurisprudence demands a principled
reason for limiting the inevitable impact of Janus on public employee speech
doctrine. Although the Court has suggested that collective bargaining’s
impact on the public fisc or the powerful voice of a public union make
agency fees different than other public employee speech, these distinctions
provide neither a workable nor satisfying rationale for treating these two
types of expression differently. Thus, it will not to be possible to cabin
Janus’s holdings to agency fees jurisprudence. As the Court recognized in
Connick, “[t]o presume that all matters which transpire within a government
office are of public concern would mean that virtually every remark—and
certainly every criticism directed at a public official—would plant the seed
of a constitutional case.” 162 The Janus decision has sown these seeds. In the
next Part, this Note explores the doctrinal consequences of Janus, including
156 See Massaro, supra note 124, at 28 (“[U]nder Connick the courts must assess the social utility of
employee speech twice—first, in determining whether the speech falls within the amendment, and again
in determining whether speech within the amendment can be restricted.”).
157 Id.
158 See, e.g., Kozel, supra note 123; Rosenthal, supra note 123.
159 See SMOLLA, supra note 119, § 18:26 (observing that currently courts often resolve employee
speech claims as a matter of law at step one of Pickering).
160 Fact-intensive claims are more likely to survive motions for summary judgment. See
10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2712 (4th ed. 2018)
(explaining that one purpose of the federal summary judgment rule is to preserve resources for cases with
genuine factual disputes); see also Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial:
Implications of the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1330 (2005) (arguing that shifts heightening
the summary judgment standard have contributed to the reduction in the number of cases that go to trial).
161 Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000 567 U.S. 298, 311 (2012) (“Acceptance of the free-rider argument as
a justification for compelling nonmembers to pay a portion of union dues represents something of an
anomaly—one that we have found to be justified by the interest in furthering ‘labor peace.’ But it is an
anomaly nevertheless.” (citation omitted)).
162 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1982).
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its pronouncements that matters involving unions, public expenditures, and
public policy are inherently of concern to the public.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH DOCTRINE
This Note argues that the Court’s decision in Janus is likely to
destabilize public employee speech doctrine. What had once been presumed
internal disputes could become constitutional issues. This Part considers the
implications that follow from this doctrinal shift in the definition of matters
of public concern in a government workplace. A few scenarios emerge that
would reach different results under Janus. The Court’s new reading of
Pickering’s public concern test and its declaration that union speech is
inherently political would allow three kinds of speech to more easily clear
the first step of Pickering. 163 Public employees would have a strong basis for
claiming protection for (1) speech on union-related topics, (2) speech as a
union official, and (3) speech about workplace matters that could trigger
public interest. Thus, the long-established line between public and workplace
matters could erode, providing a new basis for public employees to claim
constitutional protections for workplace speech.
A. Union-Related Speech
Courts have only rarely declared that certain topics are inherently
matters of public concern—for example, public voting or reports of official
misconduct. 164 For union-related speech, courts prior to Janus applied the
multifactor Connick test, examining the content, form, and context of the
speech. 165 While some circuits held that public employee speech about
unions usually qualifies for free speech protections, 166 others conducted a
more searching, fact-specific analysis. 167 Multiple courts declared that not all

163

See supra Section I.B.
See, e.g., Davignon v. Hodgson, 524 F.3d 91, 101 (1st Cir. 2008) (explaining the court’s cautious
approach to deeming specific topics as inherently matters of public concern).
165 See SMOLLA, supra note 119, § 18:12.50 (“There is no clear, clean answer, and courts have
reached different results, depending on the context and content of the particular union-related speech.”);
5 EMPLOYMENT COORDINATOR § 1:19 (2018) (“There is no per se rule regarding whether union-related
speech by a public employee is protected by the First Amendment; it may or may not address a matter of
public concern.”).
166 See, e.g., Clue v. Johnson, 179 F.3d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that union activities that
“necessarily entail a substantial criticism of management raise matters of public concern”).
167 Thomas v. Del. State Univ., 626 F. App’x 384, 388–89 (3d Cir. 2015) (“While it is true that union
activities may sometimes touch on a matter of public concern, it is not the case that all union-related
grievances do . . . .” (citation omitted)); Torres v. Pueblo Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, No. 98-1412, 2000 WL
1346347, at *4 (10th Cir. Sept. 19, 2000) (stating the court is “unwilling to hold that an employee’s speech
or activity touches on a matter of public concern merely because it is union-related”).
164
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union-related speech is a matter of public concern.168 For example, courts
have held that employees at a jail had no right to post a memorandum urging
their coworkers to invoke their rights to union representation in the midst of
an investigation into prescription drug trafficking 169 and that a state prison
psychologist’s speech in his capacity as union representative was merely an
employee grievance and not a matter of public concern. 170 However, because
the Janus Court declared that union activity is inherently a matter of public
concern, many of these union activity retaliation cases could turn out
differently, with employee speech about union representation and collective
bargaining agreements falling on the other side of the line.171
B. Speaking as a Union Official
The Janus Court’s holding about union-related speech can help public
employees satisfy another part of the public employee speech framework:
speaking as a citizen. To be successful, an employee must show (1) she was
not speaking merely as an employee (under Connick and Pickering) and (2)
she was not speaking pursuant to her official duties (under Garcetti). 172 This
had not been an easy task in the doctrinal framework that existed prior to
Janus. The Janus decision appears to have changed that. As the Janus Court
noted, collective bargaining and contract enforcement are not related to an
employee’s official duties under Garcetti. 173 And the Court declared these
activities to be “inherently political speech” of “great public concern.”174
If all speech by a union is inherently of public concern, then employees
who also serve as union officials should be able to claim protection. A
number of circuits already hold that when individuals speak in a union
capacity, they speak as citizens, and not as employees. 175 Other circuits have
168 See Davignon, 524 F.3d at 102 (noting that an individual employee persuading fellow employees
to attend a union picket showed both elements of personal grievance and matters of public concern);
Boals v. Gray, 775 F.2d 686, 693 (6th Cir. 1985) (noting that an employee did not speak on a matter of
public concern when he requested a union representative and received an extra two days of suspension in
retaliation).
169 Gillis v. Miller, 845 F.3d 677, 687 (6th Cir. 2017).
170 Olendzki v. Rossi, 765 F.3d 742, 749 (7th Cir. 2014).
171 Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2480 (2018).
172 See supra Section I.B.
173 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2474 (observing that, “when a union negotiates with the employer or
represents employees in disciplinary proceedings, the union speaks for the employees, not the employer”).
174 See id. at 2480, then id. at 2475.
175 See, e.g., Boulton v. Swanson, 795 F.3d 526, 534 (6th Cir. 2015) (“It is axiomatic that an
employee’s job responsibilities do not include acting in the capacity of a union member, leader, or
official. . . . We therefore hold that speech in connection with union activities is speech ‘as a citizen’ for
the purposes of the First Amendment.”); Hubbard v. Clayton Cty. Sch. Dist., 756 F.3d 1264, 1268 (11th
Cir. 2014) (holding that a school employee who was “on-loan” to serve as president of educators’
association was not acting in furtherance of official duties); Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, 710 F.3d 1049,
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been more reluctant. For example, when police officers engaged in ongoing,
heated conversations with management to advocate for the department
implementation of twelve-hour shifts, the Third Circuit flatly rejected the
argument that “union activity is per se protected conduct” for purposes of
Garcetti analysis. 176 Similarly, an assistant fire chief offering advice to
fellow employees about the collective bargaining agreement was excluded
from protection because the Eleventh Circuit held that his fellow employees
sought him out due to his position as fire chief; thus, his speech was pursuant
to his official role under Garcetti. 177 Likewise, when a deputy sheriff who
served as union vice president approached a superior to raise public safety
concerns about mandatory overtime and lack of breaks between shifts, the
Seventh Circuit carefully parsed the conversations to determine whether the
deputy was speaking in a union capacity or as “a disgruntled employee, not
a citizen.” 178
Following Janus, the Court has now clarified that union activity is
inherently of public concern. Thus, a public employee acting as a union
official, or perhaps even as a union member, could satisfy the Pickering–
Connick–Garcetti requirement of speaking as a citizen.
C. Workplace Speech on Everyday Employment Matters
While the Court in Janus declared that union speech is of great public
concern because the topics of collective bargaining affect public
expenditures and public policy, it provided no guidance as to when other
speech affecting public expenditures and policy issues might also be
constitutionally important. This has reopened the possibility of affording
protection to a whole range of topics for public employees. An employee
who objects to being assigned overtime work, criticizes a supervisor’s
allocation of resources, or advocates for more compensation might have a
constitutional case. For example, at oral argument in Harris, Justice Scalia
1060 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the inherent conflict of interest between an employer and a union is
evidence that acting as a union representative is not speaking in furtherance of official duties); Nagle v.
Village of Calumet Park, 554 F.3d 1106, 1123 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that statements made in the context
of being the union official were not made pursuant to official duties).
176 Killion v. Coffey, 696 F. App’x. 76, 79 n.4 (3d Cir. 2017); see also Thomas v. Del. State Univ.,
626 F. App’x. 384, 388–89 (3d Cir. 2015) (“While it is true that union activities may sometimes touch on
a matter of public concern, . . . it is not the case that all union-related grievances do . . . . [Plaintiff’s]
grievances related to ‘working conditions and other issues in union members’ employment,’ and
[Plaintiff] offers nothing that would transform those personnel matters into issues of interest to the broader
community.”).
177 Moss v. City of Pembroke Pines, 782 F.3d 613, 619 (11th Cir. 2015).
178 Graber v. Clarke, 763 F.3d 888, 897 (7th Cir. 2014). The court concluded that only where he
invoked the collective bargaining agreement in the conversations and did not speak in an insubordinate
and hostile manner was he speaking as a citizen. Id. at 898.
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pressed the petitioner’s counsel as to whether an individual employee who
discusses his own wages is speaking on a matter of public concern. 179
Likewise, Justice Kagan argued in Janus that, when employees agitate
collectively around issues like merit pay or health benefits, they would be
able to claim protection under the Court’s new view of public concern. 180
Indeed, Justice Alito acknowledged that, under the right facts, these
employees could succeed. 181
The Court stopped short of declaring that all union grievances are
matters of public concern, but it indicated that some almost certainly are.182
This could allow some employee grievances to clear both the Pickering–
Connick requirement of speaking as a citizen and the Garcetti limit on speech
pursuant to official duties, leading to different results. 183 For example, when
a teacher filed a grievance with the union “to complain about his supervisor’s
failure to discipline a child in his classroom,” the Second Circuit held that he
was “speaking pursuant to his official duties and thus not as a citizen.” 184
Accordingly, the teacher’s speech was not protected by the First
Amendment, and the court did not address whether it was on a “matter of
public concern.” 185 If this teacher could show his grievance complained not
primarily about an individual decision by a supervisor but instead about the
school’s disciplinary policy, then the employee could make a case that he
had spoken chiefly about a matter of education policy. Likewise, a teacher
facing retaliation for her complaints about outdated textbooks or inadequate
resources might make an argument that her expression was centered on the
impact on public expenditures or the public policy implications, as opposed
to the private impact on her job duties.
Going forward, when courts apply this new reading, i.e., that matters of
public concern are topics that are “important,” they will be forced to
conclude that workplace speech is back on the table for step one of Pickering.
So long as employees can demonstrate that such speech is of sufficient
importance to the public, they should be able to demand protection for
179 Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014) (No. 11-681). Posing
a hypothetical scenario of an individual police officer complaining to the police commissioner about his
wages, Justice Scalia said, “It seems to me it’s always a matter of public concern, whether you’re going
to raise the salaries of policemen, whether it’s an individual policeman or . . . a combination of policemen
or a union. It’s always a matter of public concern, isn’t it?” Id.
180 Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2496 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
181 Id. at 2477 n.23.
182 See id. at 2476–77 (explaining that grievances speak on a public policy issue when their goal is
to force the state to allocate funds for contractually agreed-upon raises).
183 See supra Section I.B.
184 Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 2010).
185 Id.
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workplace-related speech. If employee speech qualifies as a matter of public
concern in one of the three categories above, that is not the end of the matter.
Once an employee demonstrates at the first step of Pickering that she was
speaking on a matter of public concern, she faces a second hurdle—
Pickering’s balancing test. 186 She must demonstrate that her interest in
speaking outweighed the potential harm to her employer.
Without a line demarcating what constitutes a workplace matter, the
problem of turning ordinary workplace disputes into constitutional cases
reemerges. Public employees both make and implement decisions with
implications for public expenditures and public policy. They undoubtedly
have opinions on the allocation of public resources within their agency,
office, or school. Compensation, merit pay, work duties, evaluation,
promotion, and seniority can affect public expenditures and the provision of
public services, and sometimes both. 187 Extending the First Amendment to
all of these topics would stretch public employee protections to an
unmanageable degree. It is also contrary to the Supreme Court’s recognition
that the government needs wide latitude when acting as an employer, as
opposed to a sovereign. 188 As Justice William Brennan acknowledged in his
dissent in Connick v. Myers, certain forms of employee expression are
certainly speech, but they should not be subject to First Amendment
protection if uttered by an employee. 189 If an employee is directed to perform
a task related to his job, common sense dictates that, in most cases, saying
“no” should remain a lawful reason to discipline or fire him.
CONCLUSION
The Court’s decision to overrule Abood is predicted to dramatically
curtail the resources and political strength of public sector unions, thus
reducing public employee power and voice. 190 An accompanying shift in the
line between workplace speech and matters of public concern, however,
offers welcome footing for litigants to claim free speech protections for a
wide range of union- and employment-related speech. When employees
186

Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); see also supra Section II.C.
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2474–77.
188 See Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 598–600 (2008) (describing the Court’s
holdings giving public employers latitude vis-à-vis warrant requirements, due process protections from
discharge, and regulations of public employee speech).
189 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 165 n.3 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
190 See Liptak, supra note 47 (predicting that unions will lose millions of dollars in funding and
become less effective). See generally Maria O’Brien Hylton, Friedrichs and the Move Toward Private
Ordering of Wages and Benefits in the Public Sector, 23 CONN. INS. L.J. 177 (2016) (describing a
devastating overall decline in public union membership and revenue following the end of statutorily
authorized agency fees in Wisconsin).
187
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agitate on the conditions of employment, particularly with fellow employees,
they now have a stronger First Amendment basis to claim protection from
retaliation. This may be cold comfort to those concerned about the vitality
and ultimate survival of public unions, but it does point a new and potentially
fruitful direction for those who continue to advocate for workers’ rights.
For those who care about the efficient delivery of our public services,
there is reason to be alarmed. The resulting doctrinal uncertainties threaten
to cause significant confusion for government employers attempting to
comport with the requirements of the First Amendment. The Court has
repeatedly asserted its concern that an “[u]nrestrained application” of the
First Amendment in government employment could interfere with the
government’s ability to manage its internal operations. 191 The scenario that
every employment decision could become a constitutional matter seemed far
from the realm of possibility so long as a line remained between internal
workplace matters and matters of public concern. At least for the near future,
this scenario now appears more likely.
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